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X CORPS LOGISTICS DURING EIGHTH ARMY OFFENSIVE OF 1950

BY

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM	
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
	AD-A175 414		
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED	
X Corps Logistics During Eighth Army Offensive of 1950		STUDENT PAPER	
7. AUTHOR(s)		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
LTC Robert A. Gimbert			
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050			
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS	
SAME			
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE	
		21 April 1986	
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES	
		46	
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)	
		UNCLASSIFIED	
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)			
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
Prepared as an Individual Study, USAWC Military Studies Program Paper, Project Advisor, Doctor Edward J. Drea			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
Korean War, 1950-1953; Logistics; Combat Support; Combat Service Support; Logistic Support Offensive Operations; Logistic Support Retrograde Operations; X Corps; Eighth Army			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
<p>The basic question is whether or not an historical example of major tactical operation provides logistics lessons learned which are germane to the modern strategist or logistician. Lessons learned may be applied to current logistics doctrine and/or operational policies to enhance, validate, or invalidate current methods used to provide combat service support to combat forces in a conventional conflict. Additionally, while the warfighting community has preserved its successes through</p> <p>(continued)</p>			

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

X CORPS LOGISTICS DURING EIGHTH ARMY OFFENSIVE OF 1950

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY

by

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21 April 1986

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert A. Gimbert, LTC, QM
TITLE: X Corps Logistics During Eighth Army Offensive of 1950
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE: 21 April 1986 PAGES: 43 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The basic question is whether or not an historical example of major tactical operation provides logistics lessons learned which are germane to the modern strategist or logistician. Lessons learned may be applied to current logistics doctrine and/or operational policies to enhance, validate, or invalidate current methods used to provide combat service support to combat forces in a conventional conflict. Additionally, while the warfighting community has preserved its successes through literature, for posterity, little has been done to formally chronicle the effort and successes of logistical support components which accompanied combat units to the battlefield. Primary research centered upon contemporary Korean War reports of the units involved in the conflict including Eighth US Army, Korea, Japan Logistics Command, and X Corps. Extensive use was made of operations and administrative orders and associated maps. Study of the period also provided a perception of the evolutionary development of logistics organizations which are in the current force structure. Research revealed that tactical/strategic decisions have a significant impact upon logistics capabilities which, in turn, hold the key to the relative success or failure of combat forces. It further validated the propriety of making optimum use of indigenous resources viz., labor and industrial capacity, rather than forming US units to perform menial tasks or to avoid providing large quantities of US equipment. This particular finding deserves a particular caution. Contemporary thinking tends to place extensive reliance on host nation support to cover existing gaps in US Army capability. Thus, resulting plans assume away potentially serious shortfalls. Our object must be assured logistics support which is attainable only through the provision of adequate resources. Lastly, the doctrinal concept of logistics support being a national responsibility is, at best, obsolescent. Until rationalization, standardization, and interoperability are achieved universally, problems will exist. However, some commodities like petroleum, food and some types of ammunition are common in the NATO context. US policy should take into account those commodities which can be provided by any alliance member to another and act accordingly.

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CHAPTER I

PUSAN TO INCHON

The last days of July 1950 were desperate ones, indeed, for soldiers of Eighth United States Army (EUSA) and the battered elements of the Republic of Korea (ROKA) as they retreated into the lodgement which was to be called the Pusan Perimeter. By 4 August, the southeastern corner of the Korean Peninsula had become a potential death trap for both the United States forces, which had been rushed to the area from Japan in June and July, and for those of the Republic of Korea. North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) forces encircled the perimeter from the north and west. To the south and east of the beleaguered forces lay the Sea of Japan. There were few options left the defenders except to stand and die or to evacuate forces to Japan and leave behind a unified, Communist Korea.

During the next 42 days, EUSA fought a series of bitter battles along the perimeter while concurrently building combat power in the form of tactical units and a logistical support infrastructure which would permit the Free World to conduct its first offensive action of the conflict. For the price of men and materiel, the United Nations Command (UNC) bought time.

The Far East Command (FEC), responsible for the American land, sea, and air forces in the theater had begun planning an amphibious assault on the Korean west coast shortly after the NKPA attack opened on 25 June. During August and early September, FEC completed plans and issued orders for the soon to be activated X US Corps which was to be commanded by Major General Edward M. Almond. General Almond was, during the

planning phase of Operation Chromite, the Chief of Staff, Far East Command. He was completely loyal to General Mac Arthur and enjoyed the total confidence of the Commander-in-Chief, FEC.¹ This affinity was to produce a rather unconventional relationship between Lieutenant General Walton Walker, Commanding General, EUSA, Korea and General Almond in terms of both command and logistical arrangements.

Major combat units assigned to X Corps were the 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, and the 7th Infantry Division. These were newly formed organizations whose initial purpose was to conduct a seaborne assault at the port city of Inchon in September. When combat support and combat service support elements were added to the corps structure, the force contained about 70,000 soldiers and significant quantities of materiel.

Logistical support forces located on the peninsula during the initial combat phase relied exclusively upon a "push" system, an inherently inefficient method of operating because neither logistical planners nor operations officers could foresee accurately the plethora of factors determining actual needs. The following is a concise description of the logistics battle.

The circumstances under which Eighth Army accomplished its task of procuring and transporting the necessary supplies from Japan to Korea during 25 June--25 August 1950 was one of extreme urgency; every need was an immediate one. The chief, overriding problem then was the dispatch of supplies to the fighting front with the greatest haste. But that is the nature of the logistical problem posed by every tactical situation, the all-inclusive problem encountered wherever combat forces are supplied.²

The fact that virtually all classes of supply were in short supply both in FEC and in the United States' sustaining industrial base was

indicative of the popular and political legacy of the Second World War's end. Forces had been rapidly demobilized and the national industrial base capability to produce military materiel converted in favor of consumer goods. Moreover, Congress and the President had slashed the military budget in order to reduce deficit spending, prevent inflation, and maintain a stable peacetime economy.

Shortages of military supplies and equipment, limited shipping and port facilities, and the dangerous tactical situation at Pusan made it clear that the likelihood of a quick UNC victory was unlikely. In addition, it was obvious to GHQ in Tokyo that the Commanding General, Eighth US Army, Korea and his staff would be unable to control both war fighting on the peninsula and logistics support from EUSA Rear in Japan because of the geographic separation, occupation requirements, and span of control. To resolve this problem,

. . .the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, relieved the Commanding General, Eighth Army of Communications Zone responsibilities and established, on 25 August 1950, the Japan Logistical Command, assigning to it those missions of Eighth Army which related to logistical support of United Nations Forces in Korea and the occupation of Japan.³

The idea of a logistical command was a relatively new one, having evolved from the US experience in World War II. Between August 1945 and June 1950, the concept was developed and Japan Logistical Command represented the first wartime use of this type organization. The novel aspect of the concept was that for the first time a unit was formed to organize logistical support and given that mission as its *raison d'etre*.⁴

There is some evidence which indicated that EUSAK and X Corps attacks in mid-September could have been undertaken earlier had the

supply situation been more favorable. Logistics difficulties, however, continued throughout the conflict, but were particularly evident during the first six months of fighting. During the period, a number of factors impacted adversely on EUSAK's ability to support adequately combat forces engaged in battle.

A description of the tactical employment of forces leads to a description of logistical problems and challenges facing EUSA and FEC logistical personnel. The situation was essentially as follows:

Units given the mission of delaying the advance of a numerically superior invader equipped with armor were overrun with tragic regularity, and they had to be supplied. But in the absence of any certain knowledge of what equipment had been lost and consequently was needed, supplies could be sent only in bulk and up to the capability of available shipping. As one Eighth Army Officer in Japan described the situation: 'It was like sending supplies into a void. We had no idea what specifically to send, except that everything was needed, so we sent everything we could get hold of and hoped that units at the front would get what they wanted.'⁵

From this picture, a set of problems can be identified that specifically contributed to the logistics challenge which, for Eighth Army, would be exacerbated by the activation and employment of X Corps. The factors contributing to the problem were:

1. Issues of depot stocks to early deploying occupation force divisions, which were short significant quantities of equipment, drastically reduced supply levels in theater depots.

2. Initial FEC depot stockage levels were based on World War II consumption factors which understated requirements in terms of the type of conflict fought in Korea. Factors such as terrain, climate, high-demand rates, and inordinately large combat losses further complicated

the issue. Additionally, the United States policy of replacing equipment losses for all United Nations elements placed unanticipated demands on the supply system. A positive aspect of the policy was that it assured standardization and interoperability within the UN Command.

3. Items actually available in FEC depots were frequently unserviceable because of the absence of a maintenance/surveillance program over depot stocks between 1945-1950.

4. There was no central requisitioning agency established to direct and supervise movement of supplies from Japan to Korea. The push system mentioned earlier represented the only hope of providing needed materiel in a timely manner.⁶

5. Replenishment requisitions from FEC depots to the Continental United States (CONUS) wholesale base could not be rapidly filled because of Army-wide shortages of supplies and equipment. When items were available, time and distance factors complicated the problem of timely resupply.

6. Reclassification of combat service support soldiers assigned to Japan Logistics Command in August and September 1950 complicated the resupply problem for units in Korea. The combat situation was so desperate that soldiers were reclassified into the infantry military occupation specialty and assigned to EUSAK units as filler personnel.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER II

THE BIRTH OF X CORPS

The tactical scheme involving the destruction of the NKPA Force operating around the Pusan area and the reestablishment of the intra-Korean border involved a two-pronged offensive by allied forces. Eighth Army was to strike northwest from its encircled position to destroy enemy elements along the Pusan-Seoul axis. X Corps was ordered to conduct an amphibious assault at Inchon, to seize Seoul and Suwon Airbase, and to destroy enemy elements retreating in zone from the EUSAK offensive. MacArthur and his staff had devised the classic hammer and anvil strategem using a seaborne envelopment as the anvil.

X Corps was heavier than its sister corps operating in the theater. The description of X Corps along with the rationale for its relative "heaviness" is as follows.

To enable X Corps to operate independently, General Douglas MacArthur . . . authorized X Corps additional allowances of personnel and equipment. Augmentation included service-type units. CINCUNC also directed X Corps to establish a minimum 15-day level for all classes of supply by D plus 10, and a minimum 30-day level by a later date. EUSAK, however, was to be prepared to assume logistical support of X Corps after junction of the two forces and upon order of the United Nations Command.⁷

In addition to X Corps Headquarters, the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division, MacArthur assigned the Corps sizeable and very capable combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements. Major CS elements were:

Artillery Units

95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer)
96th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer)
50th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion (SP)
Company A (Reinforced) 66th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion
19th Engineer Combat Group
2d Engineer Special Brigade⁸

The attached corps combat service support structure was capable of providing high quality, timely support to combat and combat support units and included the following organizations:

Ordnance Units

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 328th Ordnance Battalion.
(MAJ G.P. Montgomery, Commanding)
1st Ordnance Medical Maintenance Company
2d Ordnance Medical Maintenance Company
Detachment, 330th Ordnance Depot Company (5 officers, 58 EM)
69th Ordnance Ammunition Company
58th Ordnance Ammunition Company
504th Chemical Service Detachment
Attached Unit
21st Chemical Decontamination Company (CADRE)

Quartermaster Units

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 142d Quartermaster Battalion. (LTC B.B. Baber, Commanding)
Attached Units
58th Quartermaster Salvage Company
1st Platoon, 565th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company (-)
580th Quartermaster Service Company
821st Quartermaster Bath Company
1st Platoon, 529th Quartermaster Petroleum Supply Company

Transportation Units

52d Transportation Truck Battalion (LTC W.C. Winton, Commanding)
Attached Units
377th Transportation Truck Company
513th Transportation Truck Company
515th Transportation Truck Company

Medical Units

121st Evacuation Hospital (SM) (COL A.L. Gorby, Commanding)
Attached Units
2 platoons, 421st Medical Collection Company
618th Medical Clearing Company (Sep)

560th Medical Ambulance Company (-) (Sep)
559th Medical Ambulance company (-) (Sep)
Advanced platoon, 6th Medical Supply Depot
Attached Unit
Blood Distribution Section, 6th Medical Supply Depot⁹

This large, powerful organization was kept under the operational control of CINCUNC rather than being assigned to the CG, EUSAK. Further, logistics responsibilities for X Corps support was not scheduled to be transferred from Japan Logistics Command to Eighth Army until after linkup of the two forces. The specific date and place was obviously unknown at the time of issuance of the operations order. Supply levels allocated to the Corps certainly tended to deny resources to General Walker's army given the theater supply and service situation.

An interesting point to note while reviewing this trooplist is the absence of units capable of providing labor to the supported forces. Labor is a logistics function and, during World War II, Labor Service Companies provided the support. Since that conflict, indigenous personnel have been used extensively to accomplish the labor mission for both combat and service units.

It seems strange that CINCUNC chose not to attach X Corps to EUSAK both for command, control, and logistics support. From General Walker's point of view, the relationship must have seemed awkward because he was the ground force commander yet he had neither authority over nor responsibility for X Corps. A theory could be postulated that General Mac Arthur's apparent favoritism toward General Almond and his corps inhibited General Walker's ability to prosecute effectively the war. In terms of equitable distribution of supplies and services this does appear to be the case.

On 11 September 1950, the 1st Marine Division less the 5th Marine Regiment which was outloaded from Pusan Port on 12 September, put to sea from Kobe, Japan. The 7th Infantry Division embarked from Yokohama on the same date.¹⁰ The landing force, which included both combat and support elements, was loaded on 200 transport ships with 60 warships in support of the operation. Both naval air and gunfire were available for the assault and subsequent actions.¹¹

In the early morning hours 4 days later, Inchon was shaken by the impact of naval gunfire preparation on and behind the designated landing beaches. At about 0630, elements of the 5th Marine Regiment successfully executed the first phase of a two-phase operation. Sustaining very light casualties, the 3d Battalion 5th Marines captured Wolmi-Do Island and other assigned objectives. Shortly after 1730, the remainder of the 5th Marine Regiment came ashore and rapidly secured all assigned objectives. The 1st and 7th Marine Regiments were rapidly disembarked and, by early morning 16 September, Inchon was encircled. Mop-up operations in the city were left to ROK Marine elements. By 18 September, Kimpo Airport had fallen to the Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division had conducted an administrative landing. The Inchon maneuver was a smashing tactical and strategic success.

Marine elements drove toward Seoul while the 7th Infantry Division attacked in an east-southeasterly direction. On 26 September, elements of the 7th Infantry Division made contact with the 1st Cavalry Division, EUSA at Osan where, just ninety-three days earlier, the first combat between the NKPA and US Forces had occurred.

At this juncture of forces, FUSA logically assumed that General Headquarters in Japan would place X Corps under its operational and

administrative control. Implicit in this attachment would have been the transfer of logistics support responsibility from Japan Logistical Command to EUSAK. This was not to be the case. In fact, CINCUNC prohibited X Corps from supporting the 1st Cavalry Division and other EUSA Forces except for emergency issues even though the Corps controlled a surfeit of supplies at Inchon.

On the following day (26 September) CINCUNC instructed X Corps to prepare to execute a new GHQ-directed operation. Elements of the 1st Cavalry Division that made contact with X Corps were a great distance from EUSAK supply installations, and EUSAK stocks were not at high levels. Consequently, EUSAK felt that it would be expeditious for forward elements of the 1st Cavalry Division initially to be supplied by X Corps. EUSAK supported the 1st Cavalry Division overland from Taegu because a message from CINCUNC on 17 September stated that except for emergency issues, forward units of EUSAK would not be supplied by X Corps.¹²

The denial of support was probably based upon General Mac Arthur's plan for subsequent tactical operations. However, this decision and others related to forces to be employed, specific missions assigned the forces, and logistics arrangements coupled with faulty intelligence contributed the debacle which is considered to be one of the most ignominious defeats in the history of American arms.

Two days after the CINCUNC message mentioned, EUSAK established its own logistics support headquarters on the Korean peninsula. The 2d Logistical Command was activated at Pusan on 19 September 1950 and was assigned to EUSAK. Its predecessor, from a functional standpoint, was the Pusan Operations Base Command. The new command was assigned the mission of requisitioning, receiving, storing and issuing supplies for the 8th Army and the United Nations Command.¹³

At this point, the nature of the Korean conflict assumed a decidedly different character. The issuance of UNC Operation Order Number 2 changed the entire scope of the political and strategic objectives in what had become a United Nations' effort. This order directed UN Forces to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. Eighth Army was to attack north to Pyongyang. X Corps was instructed to outload at the ports of Inchon and Pusan and to conduct an amphibious envelopment of NKPA elements operating in northeastern Korea, thence to attack in a northwesterly direction, and to join Eighth Army in the vicinity of Pyongyang. EUSAK was, for the first time, given responsibility for logistical support of all UN Forces operating on the peninsula. It (Eighth Army) was "also enjoined to give priority at Inchon and Pusan to outloading X Corps units."¹⁴

The impact of General Mac Arthur's tactical plan upon Eighth Army's logistics posture had dramatic results. Pre-1950 Korea was an unsophisticated, economically undeveloped state. The absence of heavy industry and mechanization permitted the nation to function without the many imperatives of a more industrialized country. Specifically, the road and rail network traversing the country was primitive and insufficient to meet military demands when the war began. Single or double line narrow-gauge rail lines and narrow one- or two-lane roads were the rule. The inherent physical limitations, coupled with indiscriminate targeting policies used by air war planners during the NKPA offensive drive south which ended in August, significantly exacerbated resupply problems in Eighth Army. Existing rail and road nets were destroyed. Three factors logistically encumbered EUSAK during the first three weeks of October. They were:

1. Lines of communication/main supply routes from Pusan to Inchon stretched 250 miles straight line distance.

2. CINUNC had, as mentioned, prohibited X Corps from providing supply support to Eighth Army elements except in emergencies.

3. Instructions contained in UNC Operations Order Number 2 effectively denied use of Inchon and Pusan ports as well as roads, rail lines and rolling stock to EUSAK.

Plans called for the 1st Marine Division to load out at Inchon while the 7th Infantry Division and Corps troops moved by truck and rail to Pusan. X Corps issued Operation Order Numbers 3 and 4 on the 2d and 4th of October respectively to direct implementation of UNC Operations Order Number 2. The applicable movement instructions/mission statements are provided in the subsequent narrative: The first order relates to the 7th Infantry Division.

X Corps Op O 3
Ascom City 9851 Korea
022000 I Oct 50

Initiate movement immediately when relieved by ELMS
Eighth Army:

- (1) All tracked vehicles and Hvy Engr Equip by rail or motor to Pusan area.
- (2) Motorized units from present areas to Pusan area by motor.
- (3) Foot Elms to Pusan area utilizing rail and motor transportation.
- (4) Organic equipment by rail and/or motor to Pusan area.¹⁵

The second order provides instructions to both the 7th Infantry and 1st Marine Division.

X Corps
Op O 4
4 Oct 50

3a. 1st Mar Div (Reinf):

- (1) Rept to atk Force Cmdr as Landing Force
- (2) Seize and secure Corps base of Opns . . . ; protect Wonsan afld, Conduct Opn shore. Coord with Corps plan of Opns. Furnish Log Spt all forces ashore until relieved by Corps Shore Party.

b. 7th Inf Div (Reinf):

- (1) Conduct mv Pusan for Mting on relief by Elms Eighth Army; Load on shipping designated by COMNAVFE.

- (2) Land Wonsan16

Marine and Corps troops outloading at Inchon also influenced Eighth Army's ability to buildup supplies for continued offensive operations:

Between 1 and 17 October, 'all discharging activities' of the port of Inchon 'were dramatically curtailed and capabilities were diverted to X Corps Loading.' The total tonnage outloaded 'was negligible and most of that was diverted to X Corps with the result that levels of some supplies were, at one time, reduced to one day.' . . .

Outloading the 1st Marine Division from Inchon prevented the use of the port to receive much-needed EUSAK supplies. Only a single-track railroad was open to Seoul at the time, a line that was not reliable. Inability of EUSA to utilize the port of Inchon caused a critical supply situation, and impeded rapid buildup north of Seoul17

In addition, X Corps was, by its own direction, inadvertently contributing to maintenance problems which would not become apparent until it had faced north and had begun its drive to the Yalu River. Terrain, weather, and poor conditions of the road network were contributing factors to the maintenance problem which the Corps faced. But the genesis of the problem was a more innocuous one than heavy use on rough roads. Throughout the period of X Corps independent operations, planners failed to include sufficient automotive/mechanical maintenance capable units in the force structure. It can be assumed

that the tactical plans called for rapid linkup between Eighth Army and X Corps. This did occur subsequent to Inchon, but after the Wonsan landing, there was never a real juncture of forces until the corps had withdrawn from northeast Korea to Pusan and there rejoined EUSAK after the Chinese Communist Intervention (CCI). This planning failure could have produced disastrous results had circumstances changed only slightly.

A factor complicating maintenance on the trucks provided EUSAK by the Japan Logistical Command rebuild program was that mean time between failure of equipment was considerably lower than anticipated. While the program produced spectacular results on one hand, breakdown rates were higher than would have been expected from US-manufactured new equipment.

As X Corps began its outloading operation, several incidents occurred which highlight friction in command, control, and personal relationships which existed between the corps and EUSAK. For example:

On 8 October, the 2d Logistical Command, a EUSAK unit, received an administrative order from X Corps. This order directed the organization to outload the 7th Infantry Division and certain X Corps units, totaling 25,000 troops and necessary supplies.¹⁸

A second and more blatant misuse of authority is provided the following vignette:

Upon receipt of the high priority assignment to furnish winter clothing to approximately 40,000 X Corps troops outloading at Inchon and Pusan, the Quartermaster Section, 2d Logistical Command, halted all other operations to fulfill this requirement. Supply coordination between X Corps and EUSAK was difficult. Although the quartermaster depot was under EUSAK control, the depot commander received a X Corps administrative order directing that support would be furnished. The EUSAK quartermaster had not seen this order.¹⁹

In both instances, X Corps inappropriately directed a unit subordinate to Eighth Army to provide it support. In the former instance coordination was not effected with the superior headquarters thus denying the Commanding General, Eighth US Army, Korea the ability to determine priorities of supplies throughout the entire Army. By this time, both I and IX Corps were in the field along with X Corps. In the case of cold weather clothing and equipment, there were theater-wide shortages so at least two-thirds of US Forces were denied equitable distribution of critical supplies. The work stoppage caused by the diversion of the 2d Logistical Command that also adversely impacted upon resupply of the two US Corps and UN Forces fighting in the western part of the country. Why General Walker tolerated this behavior on the part of General Almond's command remains a mystery. One might infer that Walker was reluctant to rein Almond in because of the latter's close relationship with General MacArthur, CINCUNC.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER III

WONSAN TO THE YALU AND IGNOMINY

In any event, the decision to conduct an amphibious operation on the east coast of Korea, the selection of units for the mission, transport assets and facilities used, and X Corps' highhanded manner clearly had an adverse affect on Eighth Army. The exact extent of the problem cannot be measured, but it clearly existed and hampered operations.

In spite of problems cited earlier, X Corps completed outloading and began steaming toward the designated invasion sites on the Korean east coast. ROK I Corps had continued its attack up the east coast of the country and on 11 October already had secured the landing area assigned to the 1st Marine Division. On 20 October, X Corps opened a command post at Wonsan. (See Map 1.) Six days later the Marines conducted an unopposed landing at Wonsan. The 7th Infantry Division, and Corps troops were brought ashore as rapidly as facilities would permit. The administrative landing of the 7th Infantry Division which began on 29 October at Iwon (180 miles north of Wonsan) ended this phase of X Corps operations.

X Corps launched its offensive with the 1st Marine Division on the Corps' left flank and the 7th Infantry Division on the right (east). The Northeast region of Korea represented a significantly greater logistical challenge than did the EUSAK area of operations. The effects of rugged, mountainous terrain, weather, lengthy transportation distance from Pusan, and lastly, enemy activity interacted to make the entire X Corps operation a hazardous one.


As the exploitation phase began, the Marine Division began its move forward to linkup with Eighth Army elements. The 7th Infantry Division attacked in a north/northwesterly direction and the logistics tail began to unfold from Wonsan port. Supply and service activities sprang up in the corps rear area as shipping was offloaded at the port. The operation strained the road and rail net originating at Wonsan and major engineer effort was required to develop adequate main supply routes/lines of communication. The opening of the port facility at Hungnam on 15 November relieved the pressure on Wonsan port facilities and the transport net supporting the 1st Marine Division, 3d Infantry Division, (which arrived in early November) and ROK elements operating in the south and western section of the corps area of operations.²⁰

As previously mentioned, X Corps was heavier than the other similar organizations operating in the theater. It is also true that all three corps assigned to the conflict were heavier than their World War II counterparts. The increased capability was, as was the advent of the logistical command, a product of an evolutionary process which has continued to current times.

The Headquarters, Eighth United States Army, Korea Monograph about logistical problems describes the change in this fashion.

One interesting fact peculiar to Korean operations was that the corps took a more active part in the control of supplies than is normally a corps function . . . Each corps had truck companies attached to it. These trucks carried supplies from the Army Supply Points to the division dumps. Usually considered uneconomical, this method was judged to be necessary in the Korean operation because of the shortages of supplies which characterized the entire campaign.²¹

The corps had control over its materiel assets and the commander could influence tactical operations with the logistical resources at his disposal. In the case of X Corps, supply flow essentially mirrored that of other similar organizations operating in the theater. The X Corps supply infrastructure mentioned in the preceding paragraph were located at the ports of Wonsan and Hungnam. The supply arrangement devised to provide rations, petroleum, oil and lubricants and ammunition (Classes I, III, and V supplies) is graphically depicted on the following chart.



From the Army Supply Points, items were moved to 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions' dumps located closer to combat elements. As forces advanced, the regulating point with its equipment and personnel were displaced forward and assumed the function of the Army Supply Point. The Army Supply Point became the Backup Point while the backup point assumed the function of the regulating point.

The opposite situation occurred when Allied Forces were forced to withdraw. Supply levels were drawn down by consumption and ultimately the Army Supply Point ceased to exist. Commanders displaced its mission/responsibility to the Backup Point which, in turn, became the Army Supply Point. The Regulating Point then became a Backup Point and the personnel and equipment withdrawn from the original Army Supply Point became a Regulating Point.²²

In the meantime, EUSAK was attempting to buildup stockage levels in X Corps in accordance with the Corps operations plan. The task was a difficult because of stock availability at Pusan and the time and distance factor between 2d Logistical Command and Wonsan. Corps troops outloading from Inchon were required to have 10 days of Classes II and IV supplies for 25,000 troops. The elements debarking from Pusan were required to have accompanying supplies equal to 15 days of supply, all classes, for 25,000 troops. 2d Logistical Command was further required to ship, by surface craft, sufficient supplies of all classes to support 75,000 troops for 15 days. This triple set of requirements seriously depleted in-country depot stocks. Petroleum, oil and lubricants, operational rations, cold-weather clothing and Post Exchange comfort items were in critically short supply.²³

Nor was X Corps satisfied with the support it received from Pusan. Perhaps X Corps and UN Command should have recognized that I and IX Corps were experiencing lower levels of support than was X Corps in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The problem for both other Corps was that they faced the same general difficulties as did X Corps with the additional factor of the having to compete for resupply with a maverick organization. As the situation worsened, the X Corps solution could have been anticipated.

Because of the inability of Pusan to supply X Corps with sufficient amounts of Class II and IV supplies, X Corps secured authorization from CINUNC early in November to requisition these items directly from Japan Logistical Command. Then X Corps became concerned about Class I, III and V supplies which still came by water from Pusan. These shipments were arriving in less than requested quantities since the supply section of EUSAK was editing requisitions down without notifying X Corps. EUSAK did this because it felt X Corps was building up its levels of supply too high.²⁴

Soon, battlefield events were to prove the wisdom of holding X Corps depot stockage levels under the authorized 30 days of supply, although EUSAK G-4 section did attempt to ensure that sufficient supplies reached Wonsan and Hungnam. Even that was done badly and to the dissatisfaction of the supported unit. Some extraordinary actions occurred. The Eighth Army monograph discusses the following attempt by 2d Logistical Command to solve the problem and its result:

. . . 2d Logistical Command was diverting ships from the zone of the interior directly to X Corps without checking their cargoes. As a result X Corps secured permission from CINUNC to draw Class I supplies directly from Japan. Later, shortly before the Chinese offensive, X Corps obtained authority to receive all classes of supply directly from Japan Logistical Command. Pusan supplied only such items as tents, stoves, and winter clothing . . .²⁵

During this period, CINCUNC issued new instructions to the Commanding General, EUSAK and the Commanding General, X Corps. The commander's intent was to strike north along a broad front and destroy remnants of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA). The successful execution of this mission would result in a unified Korea controlled by the Republic of Korea. X Corps issued Operation Order Number 7, 252400I November which assigned new divisional objectives:

- 3.a. 1st Marine to attack 270800I Nov 50 to seize Mup Yong-Ni, Advance to Yulu and destroy enemy in zone.
- 3.b. 7th Infantry Division to 'Attack N. at 270800I Nov 50 from Chosin Reservoir, advance to Yaku River and destroy En in zone.
Secure Pungsan (DA 2818) area coording opns with I ROK Corps.
- 3.d. 3d Infantry Division (US)
 - (1) "Gain and maintain contact Rt flank Eighth Army along boundary in zone.
 - (2) Protect w flank X Corps in zone.
 - (3) Sup 1st Mar Div on X Corps O."26

Administrative Order Number 7-50, 25 November 1950 provided logistical support information for combat troops. It provides an excellent sense of how the corps was to be supported as it attacked toward the Manchurian Border. The following supply and transportation data was provided to corps units: (See Map 2)

- 1. Supply:
 - a. Chemical
 - (1) Cl II and IV Depot, Hamhung, 504th Cml Svc Det
 - (2) Cl V Depot, Hamhung, 504th Cml Svc Det
 - (3) Cl V Dump, Wonsan, ASP, 0803
 - (4) CL V Dump, Pukchong ASP, 0802
 - b. Engineer:
 - (1) Map Depot Hamhung, 8223d Eng Map Distr Det
 - (2) Cl II and IV Depot, Hungnam Port Area, 8224th Eng Const Gp
 - (3) Cl IV Dump, Wonsan

c. Ordnance:
 (1) Cl II and IV Depot, Hamhung, Det, 330th
 Ord Dep Co
 (5) Cl V Depot, Hamhung, 0801, 69th Ord
 Ammo Co (-)
 (6) ASP 0803, Wonsan, 58th Ord Ammo Co (-)
 (7) ASP 0802, Pukchong, Det, 69th Ord Ammo
 Co (-)
 (8) ASP 0804, Pohu-Jang, Det, 58th Ord Co
 Ammo

h. Supply levels
 (1) Maximum thirty (30) days, all classes
 in Corps Depot
 (2) Minimum five (5) days maximum ten (10)
 days Cl I, III, and V will be maintained in Div
 SP's with a maximum of 2 1/2 days in hands of
 troops.

3. Transportation:

c. Water
 (1) Songjin to be utilized if required
 (2) Requests for water movement to X Corps,
 ATTN: G-4
 d. Air
 (1) Airdrop of equip, and supplies limited
 to critical items
 (2) Airheads for C-47 Acft now established
 at Yonpo, Kilchu, Hoamun-Dong and on Chosin
 Reservoir.²⁷

X Corps assigned axes of advance to its major combat elements. 1st Marine Division was to attack along the Hagaru-Ri--Mupyong-Ni axis in the west while the 7th Infantry Division moved along the Pukchong-Pungsan axis in the east. The Hamhung-Hagaru-Ri road was designated the Corps Main Supply Route (MSR). Development of the road, however, required a major effort on the part of Corps troops and included substantial engineer work.²⁸ The 3d Infantry Division which had conducted an administration landing at Wonsan, during 5-21 November, while tasked to do several things, performed a primary function of providing rear area/flank security for the Corps. Subsequent to the

Chinese Communist Intervention, the major role played by this division was rear area security including guarding the evacuation port of Hungnam.

Even before X Corps units began their attack, a strange unexplained event occurred when on 25 October, an "odd individual" was captured by the ROK 1st Division, ROK II Corps near Unsan. He spoke no Korean and appeared to be Chinese. The exact implications of this inexplicable soldier's presence were vague. In the east there was apparently only the shattered remnants of the Inmun Gun (NKPA). No Chinese forces were expected in the area. Then on 1 November both X Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division, EUSAK clashed with strong forces which clearly were not North Korean.²⁹

Enemy resistance stiffened in the Corps area as combat units moved north. The 1st Marine's attack met stiff initial defenses when the unit moved toward Sudong on 4 November. By 10 November, strong enemy contact was made along the line Sudong-Koto-Ri. Meanwhile, the 7th Marine Regiment secured Hagaru-Ri on the Chosin Reservoir on 14 November.³⁰

Hagaru-Ri then became the forward supply point for the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division units which were centered on and to the east of the Chosin Reservoir from mid-November 1950. Estimated daily tonnage required to support this force was 1,000 short tons per day for all classes of supply which included quantities required to attain a 10-day supply level. The transport net available to accomplish this mission was one narrow gauge railway (which ran 33 miles between Hamhung and Pohu-Jang) and one constricted mountainous road 48 miles long. Until 26 November, the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, 1st Marine Division and the 7th Transport Truck Battalion (-) moved between 300-400

tons of supplies daily from the railhead at Pohu-Jang to Hagaru-Pi. The balance of the daily requirements (600-700 tons) was moved by truck from Hamhung to Hagaru-Ri. On 27 November X Corps assumed responsibility for the forward supply point.³¹

The logistical situation in the 7th Division area (east) was similar except that tonnages were smaller because of units being supplied by the 1st Marine Division. Supplies moved from Hamhung to the Division Railhead at Pukchong and from there, north by truck to the Yalu. X Corps attached a truck company to the 7th Division in order to assist in accomplishing this mission. Supply of ROK I Corps was effected primarily by water from Pusan to the port Songjin.³²

The UN offensive in North Korea had reached its zenith and hard days faced the command in the next few critical days.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

20. X US Corps. Historical Section. November War Diary Summaries. (1-30 November 1950). 1950, p. 35.

21. Eighth Army. Historical Section. Logistical Problems and Their Solutions. (25 June - 25 August 1950). 1951, p. 19.

22. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

23. Eighth Army. Historical Section. Special Problems in the Korean Conflict. (25 June - 25 August 1950). p. 40.

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25. Ibid., p. 43.

26. X US Corps. Operations Section. Operations Order Number 7 with Administrative Order Number 7-50. 25 November 1950.

27. Ibid.
28. X US Corps Historical Section. Command Report. (27 November 1950 - 10 December 1950). p. 9.
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CHAPTER IV

TERMINATION OF X CORPS OPERATIONS IN NORTH KOREA

From either a strategic or tactical point of view, the last week of November and first two weeks of December were a complete disaster for UN Forces. In the Eighth Army area of operations, UN Forces were soundly defeated by Chinese Communist Forces. The situation led Walter Winchell to proclaim, "If you have a son overseas, write to him. If you have a son in the Second Division pray for him."³³

While Eighth Army reeled under the Chinese Communist onslaught, X Corps performed a magnificent retrograde operation from both tactical and logistical perspectives. So successful was the withdrawal that units evacuated Hungnam in complete order with virtually all organic equipment, weapons and supplies. There is probably no better historical example of a retrograde operation under severe enemy pressure than that conducted during the period 11 through 24 December 1950.

The Commanding General, X Corps accurately assessed the magnitude of the Communist Offensive and approved Corps Operations Order Number 8 on 29 November. Instructions were passed to Corps units to discontinue offensive action and commence a withdrawal to the southeast into the Hamhung-Hungnam area. Corps elements would establish perimeter to allow the Corps to better defend itself as well as to secure potential escape routes. On 30 November, commanders of major X Corps units were advised of the Corps Commander's intent.³⁴

Enemy activity significantly heightened at the same time the Corps staff developed its Operations Order Number 8. South of the 1st

Marine and 7th Infantry (-) Divisions, the Chinese cut the Hagaru-Ri-Hamhung supply route in several places. Action was taken to reestablish the MSR and, at the same time, the Corps emergency air resupply plan was put into effect. The interesting part of the plan was that it used C-119 aircraft operating from Ashiya Airbase, Japan and C-47 aircraft flying out of Yonpo in Korea. The original plan called for C-47 airlanding of supplies at the Hagaru-Ri airstrip which was scheduled for completion on 1 December. Aircraft of Far East Air Force Combat Cargo Command airdropped 1,500 tons of supplies and air evacuated 500 casualties for the Marines and 7th Infantry (-) prior to the breakout (6-10 December) from the Chosin Reservoir area.³⁵

The remainder of the campaign relating to tactics has been chronicled elsewhere. The logistics effort which was a singularly successful aspect has not yet received similar attention. It seems appropriate to look closely the progress of the logistical effort in light of the tactical situation during the last three weeks X Corps spent on North Korean soil. A sample of these successes is provided in subsequent narrative comments.

By 28 November, the 52d Transportation Battalion had assumed responsibility for truck transport along the Hagaru-Ri-Hamhung MSR. The battalion's three truck companies were augmented with two newly formed provisional truck companies of 34 trucks each. The trucks were organizational equipment of the 121 Evacuation Hospital, 163d Medical Battalion, 4th Signal Battalion, 772d MP Battalion, 50th AAA Artillery Battalion, 581st Signal Radio Relay Company, X Corps Artillery, and Headquarters, X Corps. The Commander 52d Transport Battalion exercised operational control over the two companies. A traffic regulating

organization was established and manned by officers of the 96th Field Artillery Battalion and soldiers from the 5th Artillery Group. This group coordinated transport activities as materiel and personnel were moved from forward areas to the port facilities at Hungnam.³⁶

At the same time, X Corps established an ambulance pool to augment air and rail evacuation of casualties. Ambulances were taken from all separate Corps Medical detachments to form this pool. Six railcars (three standard and three narrow gauge) previously converted into hospital cars were in use. Narrow gauge cars served the 1st Marine Division while the standard gauge railcars were used in the 7th Division/I ROK Corps area of operations. Ultimately, the 163d Medical Battalion assumed responsibility for casualty evacuation by rail.³⁷

Actual retrograde of materiel began on 9 December. In order to exercise control over materiel and personnel moving into Hungnam and to make efficient use of transport assets, Control Group Hungnam was established. Colonel E.R. Forney, US Marine Corps, was the officer in charge of the organization which coordinated and controlled the outloading of ships. Concurrently, Control Group, Pusan, LTC Arthur M. Murray, Commanding, was established at the southern port to receive troops, equipment and supplies and move them to assembly areas outside of Pusan.

Both groups were extremely successful. In the case of Control Group Pusan, unloading time for ships was reduced from three days to one day at the height of the evacuation. Labor used at Hungnam included the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, 5,000 Korean civilian laborers, a quartermaster battalion (142d Quartermaster Battalion), one tank company

and an ordnance ammunition company. COL Forney controlled all of these assets.³⁸ A unit outload schedule is provided below.

X CORPS EVACUATION

<u>DATE</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
9 December	3d ROK Division Outloading	Sonjin
11 December	1st Marine Division begins loadout	Hungnam
12 December	30% Marines loaded	
13 December	60% Marines loaded	
14 December	1st Marines completed	
15 December	I ROK Corps outload begins	Hungnam
16 December	90% vehicles, 70% personnel loaded	
19 December	7th Infantry Division C.P. Loads	Hungnam
	7th Division loadout complete	
	92d Field Artillery Battalion loads	Hungnam
22 December	3d Infantry Division begins loading	Hungnam
23 December	Remaining Corps Artillery outloads	Hungnam
24 December	3d Infantry Division completes loadout at 1420. Last elements steamed to Pusan	Hungnam

X Corps logistics lessons learned are significant to the future commander who may be forced to execute a seaborne evacuation while engaged in combat. X Corps Special Report, Hungnam Evacuation, 9-24 December 1950, provides the following lessons:

1. In an evacuation by sea the setting up of a Control Group gives the flexibility necessary in operations of this nature where set plans are extremely difficult to develop and carry out.
2. In an evacuation by sea the establishment of supply dumps to supply each withdrawal position saves transportation, permits the closing out by issue of forward dumps, and eliminates confusion at the beach where maximum effort is being made to outload rather than offload supplies.

3. In an evacuation by sea, some service units must be retained in the beachhead until the final phase of an evacuation.

4. In an evacuation by sea a reserve of cargo ships and LST's must be retained throughout the final phase of an evacuation to meet all unforeseen contingencies that may develop.

5. The maximum use of all means of evacuation should be used, land, sea, and air; and during the short period of time available, each transporting command must make an all out effort to carry the maximum loads in the least turnaround time, this will be aided by well organized debarking areas and early evacuation of Control Groups to those areas.³⁹

The result were impressive. In a 16-day period, the following were evacuated to South Korean Ports.

1. Troops:

Sonjin	16,500
Wonsan	1,100
Hungnam	87,400
	<hr/>
	105,000

2. Civilians (refugees):

98,100 (excluding babes in arms)

3. Cargo:

a. 17,500 vehicles

b. 350,000 measurement tons of bulk cargo including

29,400 55 gallon drums POL
8,635 short tons of ammunition
1,850 short tons of rations⁴⁰

X Corps was attached finally to Eighth Army as its last elements evacuated North Korea. Demolition teams destroyed rail lines rolling stock, roads, and port facilities as the last units departed. X Corps remained a viable combat force and, in fact deployed for combat

operations with Eighth Army within two weeks of completing the Hungnam evacuation. If there was bright spot in Korea at this time, this tremendously successful operation personified it.

As a postscript, the tactical withdrawal of units and equipment would have been impossible without massive tactical air, artillery, and naval gunfire support. There were about 1,700 tactical air sorties flown in the last 14 days of the operation alone. The available supply rate for 105mm and 155 howitzer ammunition was increased from 80 and 60 rounds per tube per day on 5 December to 261 (105mm) and 136 (155mm) during the period 6-24 December. Ground forces were able to withdraw under minimal pressure considering the tactical situation due to the superiority in firepower available to the tactical commander.⁴¹

CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES

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34. X Corps. Historical Section. Command Report. (27 November 1950 - 10 December 1950). 1950, p. 13.

35. Ibid., pp. 43-47.

36. Ibid., p. 50.

37. Ibid., p. 49.

38. X Corps. Historical Section. Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation. (9-24 December 1950), p. 5.

39. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

40. Ibid., p. 4.

41. X US Corps. Operations Section. Operation Order Number 10. 11 December 1950, Annex F.

CHAPTER V

LOGISTICS LESSONS

There is a prevalent opinion that tacticians and strategists win battles and, in the end, wars. Both current and past combat leaders dwell upon their successes and, if the issue of logistics is mentioned, it is done so with disdain--almost as a curse. Korean War literature is of the same ilk.

There were, however, monumental logistics successes which enabled tactical commanders to attain their objectives. Conversely, there were decisions taken which superficially appeared to be right at the time but which would produce almost cataclysmic results. Whether or not the decision or event was positive or negative is not at issue. Instead, each of the four examples presented below serves as a lesson learned. Future wars will provide commanders with the same sorts of dilemmas which will contribute directly to either success or failure at the place where the infantry soldier meets his adversary.

An example of an unwise decision is taken from the Japan Logistical Command Monograph relating to logistical problems and their solutions.

In the early days of the war, a critical need for infantry personnel replacements existed. The FEC solution to the problem was to conduct Operations "Flushout" and "Squeezeout" in August and September 1950. The former produced 750 enlisted replacements while the latter produced 229 officers and 2,201 men for a 14-day infantry refresher course and deployment to the combat zone.⁴²

A reasonable assumption can be made that the majority of these soldiers were cooks, mechanics, supply, and transportation personnel. History has recorded that Eighth Army (Rear) and Japan Logistics Command had problems managing supplies for Eighth Army. The question is simple: What impact did personnel levies which drained service support personnel play on the ability of Japan Logistics Command to adequately support the combat force in Korea?

As with the question, the answer is clear. While all soldiers must be trained to perform infantry tasks, technical soldiers must have additional training in a specialized area. Training of competent, technically qualified soldiers is a more time-consuming proposition than is training an infantryman. In future wars commanders cannot squander scarce technical soldier resources as an expedient since replacements for technically competent soldiers are not as easily trained. Infantry soldiers and technicians are not necessarily interchangeable parts without a certain cost being extracted.

A second issue involves the provision of labor which is a logistics function. Not since the end of World War II have labor service units been included in the force structure. The requirement for manual labor to be done in order to free combat and service soldiers to perform their primary function continues to exist. The Korean experience in which UN Forces employed over 75,000 indigenous workers provides clear evidence of the viability of using host nation support as a solution to labor needs. Korean civilian workers were used as stevedores, truck drivers, construction labor of airfields, rail and roads, in supply activities, and even to carry ammunition to forward elements.⁴³

The third issue involves use of civilian resources in the area contiguous to the combat theaters. When the conflict began, neither US nor ROK Forces possessed adequate truck transportation. The wholesale base in the United States was unable to supply rapidly the items because of low stockage levels and an unprepared industrial base. Japan Logistical Command instituted a rollup-rebuild program using unserviceable vehicles left scattered throughout the Pacific on atolls at the end of World War II. Japanese laborers in Japanese plants exclusively accomplished the work at a lower overall cost than that of trucks produced in the United States. In the first year of the conflict, 46,000 rebuilt vehicles were provided to for force in Korea.⁴⁴

This provides a clear lesson. In future conflicts, opportunities to improve logistics capabilities must be exploited wherever they exist. Innovation and creative thinking will permit the logistician to better support combat elements. Failure to seize upon and use local resources may result in failure to achieve goals or in a waste of scarce resources.

The last successful example is one which provides a challenge to contemporary tacticians and logisticians. That is the notion of logistics being a national responsibility. Korea was a war which was fought as a joint and combined force effort. After the introduction of UN Forces, logistics problems were magnified. The problem found its solution as unit equipment was replaced by American standard items. Reimbursement for replacement items issued to UN units was effected at Government level.⁴⁵ Maintenance, supply, petroleum, ammunition and other logistic problems previously encountered simply ceased to exist.

The epitome of rationalization, standardization and interoperability was achieved in a very short period of time. We should begin now to accept the absolute necessity of Joint and Combined logistics as we accept Joint-Combined planning and operations.

CHAPTER V

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42. Japan Logistical Command. Historical Section. Logistical Problems and Their Solutions (25 August 1950 - 31 August 1951), 1952, p. 9.

43. Eighth Army. Historical Section. Logistical Problems and Their Solutions. (25 June - 25 August 1950). 1951. p. 28.

44. Japan Logistical Command. Historical Section. Logistical Problems and Their Solutions (25 August 1950 - 31 August 1951), 1952, p. 4.

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
EPILOGUE

Nearly 40 years have passed since the activation of X Corps on the peninsula of Korea. During the first six months of its existence it was activated, participated in a strategic seaborne envelopment, outloaded for a second over the beach operation in 45 days, and conducted both offensive and defensive operations in hostile territory. It conducted a virtually perfect withdrawal and evacuation of forces while in combat. The 1st Marine Division breakout from Koto-Ri has become a legendary feat of arms.

The structure, composition, and capabilities of corps level organizations were modified particularly in the logistics area. The Logistical Command evolved essentially into its modern configuration and function. T.R. Fehrenback in chronicling the war entitled his study of the conflict This Kind of War Korea: A Study in Unpreparedness. Korea was the original "come as you are war" and it provides us with solutions to many contemporary challenges. Perhaps the most important lesson is that achieving a balance between Active and Reserve Component Force structure, a balance between modernization and personnel programs, and a balance of resources between combat, combat support, and combat service support is the real issue.

Problems which the Army faces in 1986 are virtually identical to those of its 1946 vintage counterpart. The nation's attention is focused inward. Defense expenditures are challenged by an essentially hostile Congress. The enemy has expended large amounts of his gross national product into offensive warfighting capabilities. The balance


of power has shifted to the east as American industries capable of producing warfighting materiel lie fallow. The threat and a potentially more unfavorable outcome are with us always. Unfortunately, we seem to forget . . .



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JAPAN SEA

MAP 3
DEVELOPMENT OF GC
GARRISON IN X CORPS

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